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In countries like the US and the Netherlands health insurance is provided by private ﬁrms. These
private ﬁrms can offer both individual and group contracts. The strategic and welfare
implications of such group contracts are not well understood. Using a Dutch data set of about
700 group health insurance contracts over the period 2007-2008, we estimate a model to
determine which factors explain the price of group contracts. We ﬁnd that groups that are located
close to an insurers’ home turf pay a higher premium than other groups. This ﬁnding is not
consistent with the bargaining argument in the literature as it implies that concentrated groups
close to an insurer’s home turf should get (if any) a larger discount than other groups. A simple
Hotelling model, however, does explain our empirical results.
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Abstract in Dutch
Veel zorgverzekeraars bieden collectieve contracten aan op de private zorgverzekeringsmarkt. In
een empirische analyse van ongeveer 700 collectieve contracten gedurende de periode
2007-2008 laten we zien welke factoren een rol spelen bij de premiestelling. We vinden lagere
premies voor collectieve contracten bij grote collectiviteiten, bij naturapolissen, bij
werkgeverscollectiviteiten, bij nieuwe polissen, en bij zorgverzekeraars die behalve zorg ook
andere verzekeringen aanbieden. Opmerkelijk is dat regionale collectiviteiten die gesitueerd zijn
in het werkgebied van de zorgverzekeraar, hogere premies betalen dan andere collectiviteiten.
Deze bevinding is inconsistent met de onderhandelingstheorie waarbij regionale collectiviteiten
door een doelmatige inkoop van hun zorgverzekeraar juist een hogere korting (als die er al is)
zouden moeten krijgen. Een mogelijke verklaring voor de hogere premies is dat regionale
collectiviteiten minder prijselastisch zijn dan andere collectiviteiten.
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56Summary
In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system has been profoundly reformed towards a system of
managed competition. The main idea of the market reform was to increase the possibilities for
insurers to improve quality and reduce costs of health care delivery. Health insurers obtained
therefore several tools to manage care. One of these tools is group contracts which may enable
health insurers to exert stronger bargaining power versus health care providers.
The goal of this study is to explain the factors behind the premiums of different group
contracts. Our estimation results show that some well-known factors such as the generosity of
the insurance contract, whether an insurer sells other types of insurance, and the ownership
status of an insurer are important determinants for the price of a group contract. The main idea
of the study was to ﬁnd out whether the effect of a group contract on an insurer’s bargaining
vis-a-vis providers leads to lower prices for group contracts. Our presumption was that health
insurers can extract discounts from providers more easily with “nearby” contracts; that is, groups
concentrated within an insurers home turf. This would be consistent with the bargaining
argument in the literature, which states that groups create bargaining power for an insurer with
local health care providers such that the insurer can give a discount to the group.
However, we ﬁnd that groups that are located in an insurer’s home turf tend to pay a higher
price for their group contract than groups which are more spread out over the country. This is
inconsistent with the bargaining story above. Although it is possible that insurers are able to
bargain somewhat lower prices due to a large market share in a hospital, we ﬁnd that this
possible effect is dominated by a competition effect that redistributes possible bargaining gains
to more price sensitive groups. We present a simple Hotelling model that is consistent with three
main ﬁndings from our empirical analysis. First, “nearby” groups pay a higher price than other
groups. Second, bigger groups tend to pay a lower price. Third, an insurer with relatively many
“nearby” contracts, charges a lower price on the individual market. Our model shows that in
some cases lower prices in the group market spill over to lower prices for the individual market.
Regional groups that mainly reduce the number of infra-marginal consumers tend to reduce
prices on the individual market. Groups spread across regions reduce the number of price
senstive consumers at the margin of the individual market. This tends to raise individual prices.
Managed care and selective contracting has not yet materialized in the Netherlands. Health
insurers in the early years after the reform may have managed to bargain treatment prices
somewhat down, but certainly not to the extent that are reported in the US-literature in which
managed care organizations lower costs with 10-20 percent compared to indemnity insurance.
Health insurers have just begun to invest in managed care activities. It is likely to take several
years before they are able to bargain more agressively with providers which have market power
in the Netherlands.
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81 Introduction
Group contracts in health insurance are a widespread phenomenon. In countries like the US, the
Netherlands, Austria, Israel, Germany, France and Belgium people can choose whether they
want to buy insurance individually or via a group like their employer. Such group contracts are
typically cheaper than individual contracts. There are a number of hypotheses why this is the
case each with different welfare implications (discussed below). Most papers on group contracts
are based on US data (see e.g. Gabel et al., 2002; Trude et al., 2002). The problem with US data
is that (group) contracts differ in generosity. Contracts with different degrees of generosity may
also attract different risk groups. This changes the expected cost of the insured customers and
affects the price of the insurance contract. These two effects are hard to control for. The main
advantage of the Dutch data that we use, is that basic health insurance in the Netherlands is a
homogeneous good. Hence we do not need to control for generosity. Further, basic health
insurance is both mandatory and risk adjusted. This makes adverse selection issues less
prevalent.
We have three main results. First, groups pay a lower price than individuals, and bigger
groups tend to pay a lower price than smaller groups. Second, groups that are (geographically)
located close to the insurer’s home turf pay a higher price than other groups (in the next section
we discuss the Dutch situation and explain why the insurer’s home is a meaningful concept).
Third, an insurer with relatively many group contracts close to home tends to price lower in the
individual market. We show that these features are consistent with a simple Hotelling model
capturing competition on the insurance market with exogenous costs.
We contrast our explanation with the following insurer-provider-bargaining model. An
insurer tries to win group contracts to generate (quickly) a critical mass of customers.
Representing a size-able customer base, the insurer can threaten a provider to send these
customers to another provider if treatment prices are not reduced. Hence, the argument goes, the
insurance premium paid by a group is lower than an individual contract because a group allows
the insurer to bargain down treatment prices. Part of these gains due to lower prices is passed on
in a lower insurance premium. This bargaining argument is mentioned in papers like Brooks et
al. (1997) and Sorensen (2003).
In the Dutch situation, this bargaining model is not consistent with the data. In the
Netherlands providers are organized on a regional level, and therefore the bargaining power of
an insurer depends upon the number of enrolees in the region. An insurance contract with a
group that is spread out over the country does not affect the insurer’s bargaining position (to the
same extent) with any particular provider. According to the bargaining model, such contracts
should be more expensive than group contracts that are concentrated in a certain region.
Although there are signs that a larger insurer market share in a hospital results in somewhat
lower unit prices for hospital services (NZA, 2009), we do not observe lower premiums for
9groups that are concentrated around hospitals. On the contrary, we ﬁnd that the premium paid by
a group concentrated in the insurer’s home region is higher than the premium paid by other
groups that are spread out over the Netherlands. Although one could argue that an insurer cannot
raise its bargaining power vis-a-vis providers further in its home region by gaining additional
customers, this cannot explain this ﬁnding. If additional customers in its home region cannot
reduce treatment prices further, treatment prices must be low already in its home region. Hence
the premium for such a group should be low as well (at least as low as either the premium in
regions where treatment prices are higher for this insurer or for groups that are spread out over
the country). Since this is not what we ﬁnd, we cannot use the bargaining model to explain our
ﬁndings.
The signiﬁcance of this is not that the bargaining model is irrelevant when it comes to group
contracts. Indeed, the reform in the Dutch health insurance market is quite recent and insurers
are still learning how to leverage their bargaining power vis-a-vis providers. In this sense, the
bargaining explanation may become relevant over time in the Dutch market. The importance of
our ﬁndings is that even without the bargaining effect, group contracts affect prices via the
strategic interaction between insurers (as captured by the Hotelling model). In countries such as
the US, where insurer-provider bargaining plays a more dominant role (see for example Getzen,
2007), these strategic competition effects are present as well. This observation has consequences
for the welfare aspects of group contracts.
The welfare consequences of the provider-insurer bargaining model above are ambiguous.
First, it is not clear why group contracts should lead to a more efﬁcient delivery of care. For
example, consider a group of individuals. Whether these individuals are insured together
through a group contract or through individual contracts with the same insurer does not really
alter the bargaining position of an insurer versus a provider. In other words, it is not clear why
the group contract should get a discount in the ﬁrst place. This result may change for
employer-based groups that tend to exert more bargaining power and obtain higher discounts
than a random group of individuals (Lave et. al.1999). To the extent that this is driven by
cherry-picking (people working at certain employers may –on average– be more healthy) the
discounts can be undesirable from a social point of view.
Moreover, Porter and Olmsted Teisberg (2006: 38) argue that the bargaining effect of group
contracts is actually not welfare enhancing. Their reasoning goes as follows. First, they note that
the discounts given to groups cannot be explained by efﬁciency gains. There may be some cost
savings in the administration of bigger groups and other economies of scale1 but not to the
extent of the discounts observed in the US. Hence the groups are used to bargain lower prices
with providers. But these bargaining gains for insurers are losses for providers and hence do not
1 For instance, Pauly and Percy (2000) argue that group insurance in the US is less costly than individual contracts
because of lower administrative costs.
10add social value.2 In this sense, any investments made by insurers (say, in marketing and
acquisition costs) to win group contracts are socially wasteful. Porter and Olmsted Teisberg
actually go one step further and claim that this type of “provider squeezing” by insurers reduces
providers’ incentives to innovate. The idea is that insurers’ bargaining power is so much
enhanced by group contracts that providers cannot (or hardly) appropriate the gains from
innovation. This leads to underinvestment by providers in socially valuable innovations.
Our theoretical explanation of the prices paid by group contracts is not based on bargaining
but on price competition for a group in a simple Hotelling model. If an insurer wants to convince
a group to accept its contract, it needs to convince the median voter (in this group) to accept the
contract. For a group in its home turf this is easy and hence it can ask a relatively high price (but
not higher than the price for an individual contract; otherwise no one would accept the group
contract). A group that is further away from the insurer’s region (e.g. because it is spread out
over the country) has a median voter that is further away from the insurer. Hence a lower price is
needed to convince the median voter and win the contract. Further, this has implications for
prices on the individual market. As an insurer has more group contracts in its own region, the
number of inframarginal consumers on its individual market is reduced. This reduces the
premium the insurer sets on the individual market. Our data are consistent with this result.
This allows us to derive a condition under which everyone (both people with group contracts
and individual contracts) gains from the introduction of group contracts. Roughly speaking, if
group contracts reduce the number of inframarginal consumers more than they reduce the
number of marginal consumers, they are a Pareto improvement for consumers.
A seminal paper on group insurance in the US is Pauly et al. (1999). This descriptive paper
weighs the pros and cons of individual versus job-based health insurance. The advantages of
individual insurance primarily consist of tailor-made policies (given its costs) to individual
needs, whereas with group insurance the choices are limited. Further, even if all employees share
the same preferences, there is no guarantee that the employer will choose the plan that they all
want. In the Netherlands these issues play no role. The government deﬁnes the basic package for
health care insurance, which is equal for all individuals. There is thus no differentiation allowed
between (group or individual) insurance policies for the basic package within the country.
Another argument of Pauly et al. (1999) in favor of individual insurance is that in the US this is
more portable and permanent than group insurance, meaning that there is no hesitation in
changing a job because there is no need to change insurance. In the Netherlands group contracts
do not limit the mobility of switching jobs since the beneﬁt package is very similar for all
persons and differences in premium between insurers are very small compared to the ﬁnancial
consequences of switching jobs. Also the US argument that employers receive tax advantages
2 Strictly speaking this assumes that the demand for treatments is relatively inelastic so that there are no dead-weight loss
considerations.
11for group insurances (Pauly and Percy, 2000) does not hold for the Netherlands. In the
Netherlands the employers’ contribution to health insurance is independent from the group or
individual insurance contracts that employees choose. Such differences between the US and the
Netherlands make it more straightforward to interpret the Dutch data.
An important feature of group contracts is that they may trigger competition between
insurers. Gabel et al. (2001) show that in the US there has been ﬁerce price competition for
group insurance in order to enter new geographic markets and accumulate market share. Our
Hotelling model captures this effect and allows us to link it to the effects on the individual
market. Marquis and Long (2000) indicate that about one third of group health insurance in the
US is directly negotiated with providers. The advantage of these contracts is that possible
bargaining gains with providers feed directly through to a lower group premium. Direct
negotiating with providers is currently not an option for groups in the Netherlands. Further, our
analysis suggests that Dutch insurers either do not have bargaining gains from group contracts or
do not transfer such gains to consumers via lower premiums.
The setup of our paper is as follows. The next section introduces the institutional context in
the Netherlands and discusses the recent reforms. In section 3 we present our empirical results
for group contracts. In section 4 we discuss our estimation results for individual contracts. The
Hotelling model is introduced in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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The introduction of the ﬁrst elements of managed care competition in the Netherlands started in
the early 1990’s. The Dutch market for health insurance was split into social and private
segments based on an individual’s income. The social segment was compulsory and covered all
individuals below a deﬁned income threshold (about two-thirds of the population). Not-for-proﬁt
health insurance ﬁrms (so-called sickness funds) were operating in the social segment and were
not allowed to make any proﬁt. In the private segment, private insurers served the remaining
one-third of the population that was above the income threshold. Sickness funds had a series of
restrictions that private insurers did not have. They had to contract with every hospital in the
country, offer a basic insurance package which coverage was set by the government, participate
in the risk-equalization scheme run by the government, satisfy solvency requirements and accept
any citizen at community-rating premiums (Dijk et al. 2008).
Until 1992 sickness funds had a legal regional monopoly. After 1992 came the introduction
of freedom of choice of health insurers. This led to the abolishment of sickness funds’ territorial
monopolies and allowed new health insurers to enter the market. However, there was hardly any
switching of insurers by consumers and almost no competition between sickness funds. Also in
our data from 2007 and 2008 it is still the case that the former monopolist has the largest market
share in its region. Hence for the former sickness funds we can deﬁne a home region.
As of 2006, the Netherlands introduced a model of managed competition for the whole
population. The primary reason for the introduction of price competition and freedom of choice
of health insurers was to increase the incentives for health insurers to reduce the costs of health
care.
Essential features of the new model are a private insurance market, universal mandatory
coverage for a basic beneﬁt package, community rating, open enrolment, and a system of risk
adjusted premium transfers. The basic health insurance scheme covers “essential care” which is
deﬁned by law. Moreover, there is supplementary insurance covering all health services not
included in the basic package that can be purchased on a free choice basis. About 90% of the
population purchases supplementary insurance either from the same or from another health
insurer. Compared to basic health insurance, supplementary insurance is quite small and covers
about 10% of total health care costs. Although health insurers may have either a for-proﬁt or
not-for-proﬁt status, they are legally obliged to accept everybody applying for the basic package,
regardless of age, gender, or health status. While before 2006 group contracts were only
available for the privately insured, after 2006 the whole population was allowed to buy a group
contract.
Group insurance is quite popular in the Netherlands. In 2006 about 53% of the Dutch
population chose to buy group insurance; this percentage rose to 57% in 2007 and 59% in 2008
(Smit and Mokveld, 2008). Health insurers show signiﬁcant differences in their share of group
13insurance; this ranges from 0% to 95%.
Since everyone is free to choose an individual contract, group contracts offer a discount on
the premium of the basic package compared to individual insurance policies.3
Group contracts are mostly offered by employers. In 2007, 69% of all group contracts were
offered via the employer. This percentage has been quite stable since the reform in 2006. Other
possibilities to take out group insurance are through patient organizations, although their share
still remains quite small, and so-called "pseudo" group insurance, such as groups that have
formed on the internet or on the basis of sport associations. In 2007, out of all individuals
joining a group contract 1% joined a patient group and 30% had another type of contract (NZa,
2007). Studies by Schut (2006) and NZa (2007) report that access to the market of group health
insurance is good in the Netherlands and there are no signals of risk selection by insurers.
Summarizing, on the Dutch health insurance market for basic care insurers sell a
homogenous product and adverse selection issues play no role. Consumers in a region have a
tendency to buy from the former local monopolist in that market. Consumers are free to buy
insurance on an individual basis or via a group (say, employer) they belong to. These are the
elements we will use in the Hotelling model below.
3 Such discount has a legal maximum set at 10%. In 2006 the average discount for group contracts was equal to 6,6%
rising to 7% in 2007 and 2008. In our sample the legal maximum was binding for few group contracts. The idea behind
this maximal discount was to generate spillovers from the group market to the market for individual insurance contracts.
143 Group contracts
In this section we describe the pricing behavior of Dutch group health insurance contracts. The
starting point for estimating the pricing behaviour is the following standard linear regression
model.
pi = a +X0
ib +ei
In this model the dependent variable is the price or annual premium pi paid by consumers for a
group contract i for basic health insurance. The set of explanatory variables Xi are modelled as
dummy variables which we will explain later. The error term ei is assumed to satisfy the
standard set of Gauss-Markov assumptions, so that we derive the OLS-estimators for a and b. In
the next two subsections we describe our data and estimation results
3.1 Data on group contracts
We have collected premium data for most large insurance group contracts in the Dutch market.
The data is collected from 27 health insurers (of a total of 41 insurers). These insurers have
reported all group contracts with a market share larger than 1% (compared to their total group
population) with a minimum of 10 group contracts. Furthermore, at least three of the reported
contracts should be not employer-based (e.g. patient groups and internet group). Since the
dataset contains mainly the larger group contracts in the Netherlands this may cause selection
bias. For our purpose, this means that if insurers would use different price setting strategies for
group contracts with a market share below 1%, our results may not fully capture the effects on
the market for small group contracts. However, our main ﬁnding is that a Hoteling price
competition model dominates a bargaining model in the Netherlands. It is unlikely that the
market for very small group contracts (that hardly raise the bargaining power of an insurer
vis-a-vis providers) overturns this result.
The survey yielded 447 group health insurance contracts for 2007 and 343 contracts in 2008.
There is a panel of 233 group contracts that are present in both years 2007 and 2008.
Table 3.1 summarizes some descriptive statistics of the various group contracts for both
years. For 2007 we have 251 employer-based contracts that cover about 2.1 million insured and
196 other type of contracts that cover 2.7 million insured. For 2008 these ﬁgures are respectively
164 employer-based contracts (1.3 million insured) and 179 other type of group contracts (3.8
million insured). Due to the introduction of out-of-pocket co-payments in 2008, the prices for
insurance contracts decreased from 2007 to 2008.
The data covers only four (relatively small) contracts for patient organisations in both years
(covering about 16000 insured in 2007 and 7000 insured in 2008). Schut and de Bruijn (2007)
have reported at least 45 group contracts with patient organizations in the Netherlands, but most
15contracts are too small in size and therefore are not reported by health insurers in our survey. In
the last row of table 3.1 we also present the average price for individual insurance contracts
which are substantially higher than the prices for group contracts. In section 4 we will focus on
the pricing of individual contracts. In our regression model we consider various explanatory
Table 3.1 Desciptive statistics of prices and population of group health insurance contracts
Type of group contract Number of Average Minimum Maximum Number of
contracts price insured
2007
Employer-based 251 1047.98 1015.20 1179.00 2115616
Patient organization 4 1069.03 1015.20 1143.63 16076
Members of a labour union 43 1082.45 1047.06 1179.00 828026
Internet group 9 1071.31 1017.90 1137.51 58093
Umbrella Organization 58 1060.86 1015.20 1126.08 636352
( Local) Municipalities 27 1070.15 998.44 1143.63 266541
Other 55 1073.91 1025.46 1162.80 933229
Total 447 1067.96 998.44 1179.00 4853935
Individual Contracts 1153.33 1125.00 1224.00
2008
Employer-based 164 1020.62 952.78 1134.00 1269306
Patient organization 4 1039.11 1004.09 1099.98 7311
Members of a labour union 23 1035.48 984.54 1134.00 503207
Internet group 16 1018.71 952.78 1054.50 353338
Umbrella Organization 50 1015.50 963.36 1114.55 1538232
( Local) Municipalities 24 1021.40 980.10 1099.98 298268
Other 62 1024.41 973.95 1109.40 1117475
Total 343 1025.03 952.78 1134.00 5087137
Individual Contracts 1105.50 1058.64 1198.44
variables that may explain why prices differ among group contracts. We distinguish the
following factors:
Ownership status of insurer We distinguish four dummy categories for ownership in the
private insurance system. The ﬁrst are non-proﬁt health insurers, these are former sickness funds
that operated before the reforms only in the social health insurance system. The second type are
for-proﬁt insurers that operated before the reforms only in the private insurance system (default
category). The third type are non-proﬁt insurers that operated in both, the private and social
insurance system, before the reforms. The fourth category are new insurers that entered the
market after the reforms in 2006. In table 3.2 we present frequency statistics of the four
categories. More than half of the health insurance contracts in our data are deliverd by health
insurers that operated in both markets, the private and social insurance, before the reforms.
16Type of insurance contract We label group contracts into three dummy categories: in kind
contracts, reimbursement (default category) and mixed contracts. With in kind contracts the
insurer is legally responsible for providing care while with a reimbursement contract the insured
picks a provider and gets reimbursed by the health insurer. In a mixed contract some provision of
health care is organized in-kind while other type of costs are reimbursed. Table 3.2 shows that in
both years more than 40% of the contracts were reimbursement contracts. The table reﬂects the
general observation in the market that many insurers changed their in-kind contracts in 2007 into
mixed contracts in 2008. Although in practice the differences between the various types of
contracts is small, it may reﬂect signals in the market that in-kind contracts not always guarantee
free provider choice. So changing the in-kind contract into an other type of contracts could also
have been used by insurers to signal free provider choice to consumers.
Size of group contract We label the size of group contracts into three dummy categories. We
distinguish small group contracts with a population of less than 1000 enrolees (default category);
medium group contracts of a population between 1000 and 10000, and group contracts of more
than 10000 enrolees. Table 3.2 shows that most contracts in our data belong to the second
category.
Type of group We distinguish two groups: employer-based groups and other type of groups
(default category) as we have reported in table 3.1. In the category other groups we distinguish
different type of groups. There are groups with a common disease, called patient groups, and
internet groups, groups that can mainly obtain insurance through the internet. Most of these
groups are rather small and therefore only a few of them are included in our dataset. More
groups enter the data that are member of a labour union, that operate under an umbrella of a
Dutch organisation (some examples are the Dutch sports, Dutch Art organisation or the Dutch
Royal Touring Club) or have as common element that they belong to a (local) municipality. In
general the size of these groups is larger and therefore more of them enter our data set.
Duration of contract Groups and insurers can make contracts for one year (default category)
or more years (represented by one dummy). Although more than 90% of contracts are one-year
contracts it is interesting to see whether they differ in price from long term contracts. Note that
we do have some missing observations. For some contracts we could not get information on the
contract duration.
Insurer sells other types of insurance We distinguish three categories: an insurer may sell
only health insurance (default category), an insurer may sell health insurance and travel
insurance, or an insurer sells health, travel and other types of insurance. Table 3.2 shows that
almost 50% of insurance contracts are with insurers that sell many types of insurance.
17Concentration and location of groups Finally, we come to the variable that we are
particularly interested in. Insurance contracts are labeled "nearby" if all enrollees in the group
are concentrated in a geographical area about as large as a Dutch province and where this group
is located in the insurers’ region or main place of business. As explained in section 2, this is a
meaningfull concept since the Dutch health insurance market is (still) to a large extent divided
along regional lines. This is the legacy of the regional monopolies of the former sickness funds.
A bargaining model would predict (if any) a larger discount for nearby group contracts than
other type of group contracts. Since an insurer has most individual contracts in its own region his
bargianing power vis-a-vis any provider is strongest in its own region. Winning an additional
nearby group contract would enhance his bargaining power vis-a-vis the providers in its own
region even more. If the bargaining theory is applicable here, this would reduce treatment prices
for this insurer and allow for a lower premium. Groups that are not concentrated in a region do
not enhance an insurer’s bargaining power (vis-a-vis any provider in particular) to the same
extent as in its own region and hence are expected to pay a higher premium. Note that there are
some signs that insurers with a large market share in a hospital pay lower unit prices for hospital
services than insurers with a smaller market share (NZa, 2009). So, we test also whether insurers
pass on potentially lower treatment prices (obtained through bargaining with providers) to their
concentrated nearby group contracts.
Table 3.2 Frequency statistics of explanatory variables
2007 2008
% of total Total obs. % of total Total obs.
Former sickness fund 10.3% 447 6.4% 343
Former for-proﬁt 18.6% 447 21.3% 343
Non-proﬁt (both systems) 57.5% 447 65.6% 343
New insurer 13.6% 447 6.7% 343
Reimbursement 40.0% 447 41.4% 343
In-kind 46.8% 447 24.8% 343
Mixed 13.2% 447 33.8% 343
size<1000 32.0% 447 22.2% 343
1000<size<10000 45.0% 447 46.0% 343
10000<size 23.0% 447 31.8% 343
Employer 56.2% 447 47.8% 343
Duration 92.2% 410 96.9% 327
Health insurance 11.4% 447 13.4% 343
Health & travel 39.2% 447 37.9% 343
Health & travel & more 49.4% 447 48.7% 343
Nearby 22.1% 410 18.7% 325
Other group contracts 77.9% 410 81.3% 325
18To test this prediction, we compare the premiums for nearby group contracts with other group
contracts (that are classiﬁed as "other group contracts" in table 3.2). Table 3.2 shows that we
could label about 20% of the insurance contracts as "nearby". All "other group contracts" cover
about 80% of the market. Note that we have some missing observations for this variable because
we could not always label contracts into one of both categories.4
3.2 Estimation results for group contracts
We estimated several versions of the linear regression model using OLS with robust standard
errors (S.E.).5 In table 3.3 we report our estimation results for both years, and for 2007 and 2008
separately. Differences in the estimates between 2007 and 2008 can be used as an indication for
robustness of our results but may also be the result of changing behaviour of health insurers or
consumers (see the discussion of in-kind contracts below for a possible example of learning over
time).
Ownership status of insurer The upper part of table 3.3 shows that former sickness funds
charged a much higher premium than other insurers. Many of these non-proﬁt insurers entered
the reforms with limited ﬁnancial reserves compared to private insurers, and therefore were not
able to use aggressive pricing strategies (Douven and Schut, 2006). Private insurers may have a
stronger focus on making proﬁts by gaining market share in the short run. Since especially in the
early years after the reforms groups strongly responded to price (Douven et al. 2007), it is likely
that private insurers have incurred substantial losses by gaining market share with low prices for
group contracts.6 Our results indicate that especially new insurers follow aggressive pricing
strategies to gain as much market share as possible in their early years.
Type of insurance contract In-kind contracts were signiﬁcantly cheaper than reimbursement
and mixed contracts. Although most in-kind contracts still include all health care providers
(NZA, 2008), the general perception of the Dutch consumers was that in-kind contracts imply a
restriction in provider choice. Such restrictions lower administrative costs for insurers and may
make it easier to channel consumers to preferred providers (Sorensen, 2003, Zweifel et. al.,
2006). Our ﬁnding that in-kind contracts are cheaper in 2008 than 2007 may indicate that
4 During our robustness analyses we split the "other group contracts" further up into three different types of group
contracts: "concentrated & far away" (contract is in insurers i’s home turf but won by competing insurer j –this hardly
happens), "not-concentrated" and "insurer with no local focus". However, the effect of “nearby” on the premium remained
positive and signiﬁcant. Further, the coefﬁcients of the other three groups did not differ signiﬁcantly from each other.
5 In regressions with robust S.E. the estimated coefﬁcients are the same as in the standard OLS linear regressions but the
estimates of the S.E. are more robust to meet assumptions concerning normality and homogeneity of variance of the
residuals. We also performed seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and the results (not reported) were similar.
6 DNB (2008) has reported losses of health insurers of about 500 million euro in 2007 on basic health insurance.
19Table 3.3 OLS estimates of group price contracts for basic health insurance
All data 2007 2008
Constant 1124.1 1118.2 1090.2
[5.6***] [7.8***] [7.2***]
Former sickness fund 33.1 29.7 33.9
[4.6***] [5.9***] [7.7***]
Former both − 3.3 − 8.4 0.9
[3.7] [5.4] [5.0]
New insurer − 17.2 − 9.9 − 38.8
[6.2***] [7.7] [6.8***]
In-kind contracts − 11.3 − 8.3 − 19.3
[3.2***] [4.4*] [3.7***]
Mixed contracts 7.4 10.8 9.5
[3.8] [6.5*] [4.4**]
1000 < size contract <10000 − 12.0 − 7.7 − 17.9
[3.9***] [5.8] [5.2***]
10000< size contract − 11.6 − 6.6 − 17.9
[4.4**] [6.4] [5.9***]
Employer − 10.8 − 12.2 − 12.4
[2.2***] [3.1***] [2.6***]
Duration − 7.5 − 5.1 − 16.9
[4.4*] [6.2] [6.2***]
Health & travel insurance − 42.8 − 37.6 − 49.9
[3.7**] [4.9***] [5.4***]
Health & other insurances − 29.9 − 31.1 − 28.6
[3.4***] [4.6***] [4.4***]
Nearby 5.5 8.1 4.6
[2.6**] [3.6**] [3.4]
Year Dummy 2008 − 50.7 - -
[2.0***] - -
R2 0.63 0.36 0.59
Number of observations 687 375 312
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. Signiﬁcance is indicated with the following signiﬁcance levels: *=0.1,**=0.05, ***=0.01.
insurers make more use of selective contracting and that consumers learn that a restriction in
provider choice yields a premium discount in return.7
Size of group Table 3.3 also shows that the size of a group matters. At ﬁrst sight this is
consistent with a bargaining model where a bigger group allows the insurer to bargain more
aggressively with providers. However, as shown in the next section, it is also consistent with a
7 We have no explanation for the fact that mixed contracts are signiﬁcantly more expensive than reimburement contracts.
20model of insurer competition with exogenous costs. Note that the effect of group size turns out
to be non-linear. The main gain is in moving beyond 1000 participants. The next step to more
than 10,000 does not lead to further price reductions.
Type of group Employer-based groups are signiﬁcantly cheaper than other groups, which was
also indicated by Schut and de Bruijn (2007) and NZA (2008). Several reasons may play a role
here. Most employers do not only negotiate on the price for basic health insurance but negotiate
also on supplementary insurance or other speciﬁc beneﬁts such as prevention or reintegration
measures. To the extent that price competition concentrates on the segment of basic health
insurance (e.g. because this segment with homogeneous goods is more transparent for both
employers and employees/consumers), insurers compete ﬁercely to win such contracts. Such a
contract then gives access to more lucrative add-on contracts like supplementary insurance (a
heterogeneous product) for employees and reintegration services with the employer. Another
difference is that it is easier for insurers to risk rate employer-based groups since these contracts
are more access restricted while other groups are more open in their acceptance of membership.
Duration of contract Although not signiﬁcant, the variable duration shows the expected sign
and longer contracts are less expensive than annual contracts.
Insurer sells other types of insurance We ﬁnd strong evidence for cross-selling of insurance
contracts. Insurers that offer also travel and other type of insurance set substantially lower prices
than other insurers. This can be explained by the fact that consumers tend to buy insurance
policies from the same insurer. Two arguments play a role here. First, the transparency
argument, the homogeneous product basic health insurance is more transparent than other types
of insurance. Second, basic health insurance is mandatory while other types of insurance are not.
It seems that health insurers are willing to price basic health insurance aggressively since
winning such a contract can lead to the sale of other –more proﬁtable– insurance policies.
Concentration and location of groups The bargaining model sketched in the introduction
predicts that nearby groups (concentrated in an insurer’s home region) pay a lower (or at least
not higher) premium than other groups. Our regressions show the opposite result. Groups close
to an insurer’s home turf pay a high premium. The result for the year 2008 is less signiﬁcant
which may indicate that the effect is vanishing over time.
We performed other regressions to see whether the results are robust to different speciﬁcations.
As explained in footnote 4 we further subdivided group contracts that are not “nearby”. We also
extended our model by adding dummy variables representing the six insurer “mother” concerns
in the Netherlands (most health insurers are “daughters” of one of these companies). These
21insurer-speciﬁc characteristics picked up some variation, but our basic result on nearby of groups
did not change.
224 Individual contracts
We already mentioned in the previous sections (see also table 3.1) that prices for group contracts
were substantially lower than for individual contracts. The idea of this section is to analyse
whether group contracts inﬂuence the price setting behaviour of insurers for the individual
insurance premiums, and especially whether a high percentage of "nearby" group contracts
increases prices for individual contracts. In the latter case there are negative spillovers from the
group market on the individual market. The bargaining model sketched in the introduction does
not feature predictions for individual prices. One possible explanation for a negative spillover
effect is the so-called “waterbed effect” (see, e.g. Inderst and Valletti (forthcoming)). The Dutch
10% limit for the gap between prices for group and individual contracts for an insurer can be
interpreted as an attempt to reduce such negative externalities.
Table 4.1 Frequency statistics of explanatory variables
2007 2008
% of total total obs. % of total total obs.
Former sickness fund 6.9% 29 10.3% 29
Former for-proﬁt 17.2% 29 17.2% 29
Non-proﬁt (both systems) 58.6% 29 62.1% 29
New insurer 17.2% 29 10.3% 29
Reimbursement 41.4% 29 41.4% 29
In-kind 44.8% 29 24.1% 29
Mixed 13.8% 29 34.5% 29
Health insurance 13.8% 29 17.2% 29
Health & travel 31.0% 29 34.5% 29
Health & travel & more 55.2% 29 48.3% 29
Max Min Max Min
"Nearby" group contracts 93.9% 0% 84.7% 0%
Prices for individual contract (euros) 1198 1059 1224 1125
To test this hypothesis we compare the price of the individual contracts of an insurer with the
percentage of "nearby" contracts of this insurer. A note here is that we have much less
observations on prices on individual contracts than on group contracts, because each insurer is
allowed to set only one price for the individual contract. In table 4.1 we present some descriptive
statistics of our data. The frequency statistics are in line with statistics that we presented in table
3.2.8 The percentage of "nearby" group contracts of insurers ranges from 0% (38% of the cases
8 Note that some individual insurers appear more than once in the dataset because they provided different type of
individual insurance contracts (in-kind, reimbursement or also mixed contracts) with different prices.
23in 2007 and 45% of the cases in 2008) to 93.9% in 2007 and 84.7% in 2008.9 We performed
similar OLS estimations as in the previous section but now with the price of individual contracts
as dependent variable. Table 4.2 shows the results. Note that many of the results are similar to
the results in table 3.3. The main difference is that the "nearby" variable has a negative impact
on the individual price for basic health insurance. Although the results are not always
signiﬁcant, the sign is always negative and opposite to the sign in table 3.3.10
Table 4.2 OLS estimates of individual price contracts for basic health insurance
All data 2007 2008
Constant 1198.5 1201.2 1143.7
[11.5***] [7.8***] [18.4***]
Former sickness fund 21.4 8.5 40.2
[16.8] [24.4] [26.1]
Former both − 2.7 − 4.0 2.9
[9.3] [10.5] [15.6]
New insurer − 31.2 − 24.1 − 35.7
[12.2**] [13.2*] [23.2]
In-kind contracts − 19.6 − 13.0 − 30.1
[7.9**] [9.0] [14.4*]
Mixed contracts − 7.9 0.6 − 15.7
[8.8] [12.9] [12.8]
Health & travel insurance -29.6 − 37.3 − 19.9
[11.3**] [13.2**] [19.7]
Health & other insurances − 20.8 − 35.5 − 3.7
[10.1**] [11.7***] [17.8]
Nearby − 35.8 − 11.4 − 80.2
[20.1*] [25.4] [37.1**]
Year Dummy 2008 − 48.2 - -
[6.8***] - -
R2 0.60 0.49 0.48
Number of observations 58 29 29
Robust standard errors are expressed in brackets. Signiﬁcance is indicated with the following signiﬁcance levels: *=0.1,**=0.05, ***=0.01.
9 Note that since we do not have all group contracts of all insurers, the percentages here should be interpreted with some
caution. The percentage represents the number of consumers of an insurer having a "nearby" group contract divided by
the number of consumers in all group contracts of this insurer. We see this as being suggestive of the percentage of
people in the insurer’s region that have a (not necessarily “nearby”) group contract. Although the latter is the theoretically
speaking relevant percentage (see below), we do not have it. To illustrate, for a group contract that is spread out over the
country we do not know how many people in a certain region bought this contract.
10 Since the results of the regressions are based on only 58 observations, some caution with respect to these results is
necessary. We performed some robustness analysis by using different deﬁnitions for the "nearby" variable, but in all cases
we found a negative effect (although the result was not always signiﬁcant).
24Therefore, an insurer with many "nearby" groups in the market sets a lower price for individual
contracts than other insurers. Yet, the price charged for the “nearby” groups is higher than the
price charged to other groups. The next section introduces a model to explain these ﬁndings.
25265 Hotelling model
The regressions above feature three results on which we focus here. First, bigger groups (ceteris
paribus) pay a lower price. This is consistent with a bargaining model as more customers
generate bargaining power for the insurer, leading to lower treatment prices and premiums.
Second, in the Dutch situation providers are organized at the regional level. Hence the
bargaining model would suggest that groups concentrated in the insurer’s home region pay a
lower price. However, we ﬁnd that “nearby” groups tend to pay a higher price than other
groups11. Third, an insurer charges a lower price on the individual market if it has relatively
many “nearby” group contracts.
We offer a theory of group and individual prices based on spatial competition on an Hotelling
beach.We show that this model can account for the three results from our regressions above.
Moreover it allows us to address the normative question: under which conditions are all
customers (both in group and individual contracts) better off with the introduction of group
contracts.
The intuition driving the model is the following. We assume that when deciding on group
contracts, the median voter is pivotal in making the choice between contracts (two in this case).
Although it is not obvious that group decision making is well described by a median voter
model, it is a reasonable assumption to make. To illustrate, an employer may want to choose the
contract that is preferred by the majority of its employees. Recall that in the Netherlands the
employer contribution to health insurance is independent from the (group or individual) contract
chosen by its employees. Hence there is nothing to gain for the employer by choosing a contract
that is disliked by the majority of its employees.
When bidding for a group contract concentrated in its home turf, an insurer knows that the
median voter in this group is biased in favor of its contract. Hence it can offer a relatively high
price and still win the contract. With groups that are scattered over the country or when an
insurer does not have a home turf, the median voter is harder to convince which leads to a lower
price for the contract.
Similarly, when a group increases in size by spreading out geographically, the median voter
tends to move away from the insurer. This ensures that the insurer has to offer a lower price to
win the group contract.
Finally, prices for individual contracts are determined by the ratio of inframarginal over
marginal consumers. Nearby contracts reduce the number of inframarginal customers thereby
leading to lower individual prices.
11 Another possible theory that explains higher prices would be that hospitals have all the market power and that insurers
with a large market share in a hospital have to pay higher unit prices for hospital services than insurers with a smaller
market share. As explained in section 3 this theory contradicts the empirical ﬁnding that a large market share in a hospital
in general leads to lower unit prices (NZa, 2009).
275.1 Group contracts
To formalize this intuition, consider the Hotelling beach in ﬁgure 5.1 with travel costs t and
length 1. Two insurers Ia;Ib are located at the far left and right sides of the beach resp. Both
insurers have identical constant marginal costs equal to c.12 The travel costs t capture the
regional orientation of the Dutch insurance markets. Before the reform, sickness funds were
organized at the regional level. As discussed in section 2 people in a region formerly serviced by
a sickness fund, tend to stay with that sickness fund. This is captured in the following way. A
consumer at distance x 2 [0;1] away from Ia values the disutility of buying insurance from Ia at
price pa as
pa +tx
and for Ib at price pb this expression becomes
pb+t(1 x)
Note that we can ignore the value of insurance itself since it is the same for both insurers (and
both individual and group contracts). Further, buying basic insurance is mandatory in the
Netherlands hence we also do not need to consider whether a consumer values insurance enough
to buy it in the ﬁrst place.
The consumer indifferent between buying from Ia and Ib lives at a distance ¯ x from Ia:





Hence even if pa > pb there are still people close to Ia (that is people at a distance x 2 [0; ¯ x] away
from Ia) that keep on buying insurance from Ia. This captures the regional bias mentioned above.
Consumers are uniformly distributed over the beach with density 1 (hence total mass of
consumers is normalized to 1). We consider four group contracts on the Hotelling beach:
C1;C2;C3;C4.
Group C1 is a “nearby” group for insurer Ia. The consumer ofC1 closest to Ia is a distance d1
away from Ia; the consumer furthest away is located at d1+s1 < 1
2. The density ofC1 is denoted
by h1. Hence the median voter ofC1 is located at d1+ 1
2s1. The best offer that Ib can make to the
median voter is a price equal to c and hence the median voter’s disutility from buying Ib’s
contract equals c+t(1 d1  1
2s1). A price equal to (or slightly below)13
pC1 = c+t(1 2d1 s1) (5.2)
12 In a bargaining model this cost would be endogenously determined by provider-insurer bargaining over treatment
prices. However, we claim that the results presented in the previous section are consistent with a model with exogenous
costs.
13 If insurers ﬁrst set individual prices and then group prices, it may the case –due to the max. discount of 10%– that
pC1 = 0:9pi
a where pi
a denotes the individual price of insurer Ia. We ignore this possibility as the 10%-constraint is not
binding for most group contracts in our data.







δ1 δ1 + σ1 δ2 δ2 + σ2
h1
h2
makes sure that Ia wins this group contract.14
The consumer closest to Ia in group C2 is at a distance d2 from Ia and hence distance
1 d2 < 1
2 from Ib. The median voter inC2 is at a distance 1 d2  1
2s2 away from Ib. Similar
reasoning as above gives us:
pC2 = c+t(2d2+s2 1) (5.3)
Finally, consider the two groups that are not clearly in either insurer’s home turf: C3;C4.
Distance from Ia toC3’s closest consumer is d3 and the median voter is at a distance
d3+ 1
2s3 > d1+ 1
2s1 from Ia. As drawn in ﬁgure 5.1 (in particular, d3+ 1
2s3 < 1
2), the same
reasoning as above gives15
pC3 = c+t(1 2d3 s3) (5.4)
and similarly with 1
2 > 1 d4  1
2s4 > 1 d2  1
2s2:
pC4 = c+t(2d4+s4 1) (5.5)
14 Assuming that pC1 < pi
a where Ia’s individual price is determined below. If this is not the case, then customers in C1
will buy the individual contract. Comparing equations (5.2) and (5.10) below, this condition boils down to
1 2d1  s1 < 2Fi=f i. If this condition is not satisﬁed, Ia offers the group C1 the individual contract.
15 Here we need two assumptions. First, as above, it must be the case that pC3 < pi
a, otherwise customers inC3 close to
Ia prefer to buy Ia’s individual insurance. But now we also need that pC3 +t(d3 +s3) < pi
b +t(1 d3  s3). If this does
not hold, customers on the far right ofC3 will buy individual insurance from Ib instead of buying the group contract from Ia.
This will –endogenously– reduce s3, thereby shifting the median voter ofC3 to the left. This process stops once a value is
found for s3 such that pC3 +t(d3 +s3) = pi
b +t(1 d3  s3).
29First, consider the difference in price paid by a nearby group and a group that is not clearly in an
insurer’s home turf. Here we do the comparisons for Ia, but clearly by symmetry the same results
hold for Ib. The nearby group pays a higher price: pC1 > pC3. Because the median voter ofC3 is
further away from Ia than the median voter ofC1, it is easier for Ia to convince group C1 to buy
its group insurance. Hence it can chargeC1 a higher price thanC3 and still win the contract.
Our second ﬁnding in the empirical analysis is that bigger groups pay a lower price. Since
increasing the density of a group by raising hi (i = 1;2;3;4) does not affect the position of the
median voter, it has no effect on the price paid by the group. In our model bigger groups pay a
lower price, if the group size is increased by adding customers to the group that are more price
sensitive than the median voter (i.e. that are further away from the insurer). One way to
formalize this for groupC1 is to consider an increase in s1. Indeed, it follows from equation
(5.2) that
¶pC1
¶s1 < 0. Hence our explanation for the observation that bigger groups pay a lower
price is that in bigger groups, ceteris paribus, the median voter is further away from the insurer
that wins the contract.
5.2 Individual contracts
To characterize the individual prices, we ﬁrst introduce some notation. Let gi(x) denote the





0 if x 2 [0;dii
hi if x 2 [di;di +si]
0 if x 2 hsi +di;1]
(5.6)





0 if x 2 [0;dii
hi(x  di) if x 2 [di;di +si]
hisi if x 2 hsi +di;1]
(5.7)
The density function of customers for individual contracts can be written as





where in our case f(x) = 1 for x 2 [0;1] as we assume a uniform distribution of consumers over









with F(x) = x in our example with a uniform distribution.
Insurer Ia chooses its price pi









30The ﬁrst order conditions for pi
a;pi
b can be written as
pi





























Thus we ﬁnd that insurer Ia charges a lower individual price (pi
a < pi














Since we assume a uniform distribution F, this inequality holds if insurer Ia “looses” more
customers due to group contracts on its individual market. Evaluated at pi
a = pi







Hence we have the result that an insurer with many group contracts (among its infra-marginal
individual customers) charges a lower price on the individual market. As explained in footnote 9,








the percentage of nearby contracts in all group contracts for an insurer. If group contracts are
–more or less– distributed among insurers in proportion to their infra-marginal market, this
approximation works ﬁne.
5.3 Welfare implications
The Hotelling model above gives a simple explanation for the three results we found in the data.
A natural question now is: who beneﬁts from the introduction of group contracts? In the model
above, people with a group contract are better off than people with an individual contract, but it
may still be the case that everyone (both individual and group customer) is better off with the
introduction of group contracts in the health insurance market.
In the model above, if there are no group contracts, both insurers charge the same price16
pa = pb = c+t (5.15)
Hence the introduction of group contracts leads to a Pareto improvement for consumers if and
16 This follows from equation (5.10) with pa = pb = c+2tF( 1
2)=f( 1
2) = c+t for the uniform distribution.





























Or equivalently (and simplifying notation): Fi=f i;(1 Fi)=f i < 1
2. In words, it has to be the
case for both insurers that group contracts reduce the number of infra-marginal consumers (Fi
and 1 Fi resp.) by more than the number of marginal consumers (f i). The intuition for this is
straightforward. When considering to increase its price, an insurer faces the following trade off.
A higher price leads to higher proﬁts over “existing” (or infra-marginal) consumers but reduces
the number of consumers at the margin. To the extent that group contracts reduce the former
number of consumers more than the latter, the insurance premium falls on the individual market.
Since people in a group contract are better off than people with an individual contract, everyone
beneﬁts from the introduction of group contracts in this case.
To illustrate this with the example above, consider the case of a symmetric equilibrium
(pi
a = pi
















An increase in s1;h1 and a fall in d3;d4 reduces the number of infra-marginal consumers on the
individual market. An increase in h3;h4 reduces the number of consumers at the margin where
insurers compete on the individual market.
In the Netherlands, policy makers tried to increase the spillovers from the group market to
the individual market by stipulating that the price difference between the two types of contracts
should be below 10%. The analysis above suggests another way to maximize spillovers from the
group to the individual market. Group contracts should affect infra-marginal consumers more
than marginal consumers. In the Dutch context where historically most insurers have a home
region, this implies stimulating group contracts that are concentrated in a geographical sense.
That is, an employer with a clear regional focus is a better group contract (with an eye on
spillover on the individual market) than a contract for all people playing tennis the Netherlands.
326 Discussion and conclusions
In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system has been profoundly reformed towards a system of
managed competition. The main idea of the market reform was to increase the possibilities for
insurers to improve quality and reduce costs of health care delivery. Health insurers obtained
therefore several tools to manage care. One of these tools is group contracts which may enable
health insurers to exert stronger bargaining power versus health care providers.
The goal of this study is to explain the factors behind the premiums of different group
contracts. Our estimation results show that some well-known factors such as the generosity of
the insurance contract, whether an insurer sells other types of insurance, and the ownership
status of an insurer are important determinants for the price of a group contract. The main idea
of the study was to ﬁnd out whether the effect of a group contract on an insurer’s bargaining
vis-a-vis providers leads to lower prices for group contracts. Our presumption was that health
insurers can extract discounts from providers more easily with “nearby” contracts; that is, groups
concentrated within an insurers home turf. This would be consistent with the bargaining
argument in the literature, which states that groups create bargaining power for an insurer with
local health care providers such that the insurer can give a discount to the group.
However, we ﬁnd that groups that are located in an insurer’s home turf tend to pay a higher
price for their group contract than groups which are more spread out over the country. This is
inconsistent with the bargaining story above. Although it is possible that insurers are able to
bargain somewhat lower prices due to a large market share in a hospital, we ﬁnd that this
possible effect is dominated by a competition effect that redistributes possible bargaining gains
to more price sensitive groups. We present a simple Hotelling model that is consistent with three
main ﬁndings from our empirical analysis. First, “nearby” groups pay a higher price than other
groups. Second, bigger groups tend to pay a lower price. Third, an insurer with relatively many
“nearby” contracts, charges a lower price on the individual market. Our model shows that in
some cases lower prices in the group market spill over to lower prices for the individual market.
Regional groups that mainly reduce the number of infra-marginal consumers tend to reduce
prices on the individual market. Groups spread across regions reduce the number of price
senstive consumers at the margin of the individual market. This tends to raise individual prices.
Managed care and selective contracting has not yet materialized in the Netherlands. Health
insurers in the early years after the reform may have managed to bargain treatment prices
somewhat down, but certainly not to the extent that are reported in the US-literature in which
managed care organizations lower costs with 10-20 percent compared to indemnity insurance
(Getzen, 2007). Health insurers have just begun to invest in managed care activities. It is likely
to take several years before they are able to bargain more agressively with providers which have
market power in the Netherlands.
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